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COMMENTS
Measure of Compensation for Nationalization
of Private Property
Surprisingly, the word expropriation was originally used in England to denote
the act of voluntarily ". . . giving up one's property under a sense of religious
duty."' Today it is universally understood to mean a giving up under compulsion.2
Even though compensation is paid, the compulsion is still present. Compulsory
taking of property without compensation has come to be known as confiscation.3
In its proper governmental sense expropriation aims at developing a legal
procedure capable of adjusting the claims of society and of the individual in a
particular case or category of cases." But to the person whose property is to be
taken no procedure is apt to satisfy him which does not initially give prudent
attention to his complaints concerning the proposed taking, and secondly, in case
these are not sustained, a justiciable consideration to his claims for compensation.
As far back as 11 B.C. a senatus-consultum of the old Roman Empire pro-
vided that the value of building material ". . taken compulsorily from a man's
land for the purpose of building or repairing aqueducts should be assessed viri
boni arbitratu."6
Expropriation-or as it has come to be known more generally today, nationali-
zation-has always considerably perplexed the legal theorist. How can it be squared
with the right to own private property? Is it in substance anything more than the
existence of superior force masquerading in legislative forms?6
There are two facets to this problem.
One facet concerns itself with the nationalization of property belonging to
citizens of the country that is accomplishing the nationalization. The other deals
with nationalization of property of persons who are citizens of countries other than
that which is carrying on the nationalization program. The former would not
normally involve any international problems. The latter would. Since this paper
aims not only to point out the measure of compensation now existent interna-
tionally, but also to indicate what it believes to be certain basic principles that
145 The L. Q. Rev. 512, Expropriation in Roman Law.
2 Oxford Dictionary, s.v. expropriation.
3Webster's new International Dictionary, 2nd Edition.
4Full Text of Official Notes Relating to Compensation for American-Owned Lands
Expropriated in Mexico, Department of State, Pub. 1288, p. 9, "On the one hand, there
are weighed the claims of justice and the improvement of a whole people, and on the other
hand, the purely pecuniary interests of some individuals."
5 supra, note 1 at p. 524.
6 ibid, p. 526.
should be utilized in arriving at a fair, just and equitable measure of compensation
internationally, it is believed wise to examine the theories upon which national
nationalization are premised.
It should be obvious that compensation for nationalization of private property
owned by citizens of countries other than those nationalizing the property, has
been made most frequently only under compulsion or as a result of litigation in
an international tribunal.' Logically and ideally there should be no differentiation
between the two classes of property described above, but it is difficult to convince
the ruling head or government in power that it must treat foreigners with the
same decorum and consideration it treats its own citizens.' Frequently both
foreigner and citizen are treated with the same haughty disdain and neither is
compensated, either wholly or in part.
Although it may be questioned whether or not there is any such thing as a
"legal" taking of property belonging to one not a citizen of the state, certain
tribunals have differentiated between the result consequent upon what is essen-
tially an "illegal" taking and a "legal" one.'
The Chorzow Factory Case says,
The disposition of an industrial undertaking-the expropriation of which is
prohibited by the Geneva Convention-then involves the obligation to restore
the undertaking and, if this be not possible, to pay its value at the time of the
indemnification, which value is designed to take the place of restitution which
has become impossible. To this obligation, in virtue of the general principles
of International Law, must be added that of compensating loss sustained as the
result of the seizure.
In the Smith Case the arbitrator found,
. . . that the expropriation proceedings were not, in good faith, for the
purpose of public utility ... The destruction of the claimant's property was
wanton, riotous, oppressive ....
The arbitrator concluded,
. . . that it would not be inappropriate to find that according to law, the
property should be restored to the claimant ...
It becomes obvious then that where there is a so-called illegal taking it is
well established internationally that there should first be a restitution, and if this
is not possible, sufficient compensation to make the former owner whole plus
damages for, ".'.. compensating loss sustained as a result of the seizure."10
7 See, E. g. note 4, supra; and 1 World Court Reports, Hudson, 475, The Chorzow
Factory Case.
8 Frequently there is some justification for such a distinction, at least in the mind of the
ruling head or the government in power, by virtue of the fact that the foreigner has grossly
exploited the land and property now being taken from him. He has taken out of the
property manyfold his original investment.
9 1 World Court Reports, Hudson 475, 663 et seq., The Chorzow Factory Case; Dam-
ages in International Law, Whiteman, Vol. 2, p. 1408 et seq., The Walter Fletcher Smith
Case.
10 In the Smith Case the arbitrator awarded a rather handsome sum as compensation.
Smith had claimed that his property was worth. in excess of $200,000 whereas the govern-
ment of Cuba claimed that it was worth only $35,000. The arbitrator awarded Smith
$190,000. The International Tribunal in the Chorzow Case spoke of determining the value
of the physical assets and stocks of the Chorzow Factory and including probable profit up to
17 British Year Book of International Law 1, 16 (1936); 2 Hyde, International Law
Whiteman, Vol. 2, p. 857, et seq.
One authority has said, in dealing generally with the problem of compensation
for international property losses,11
• . . evidence of the value of the property will be received by a foreign office
or an arbitral tribunal in many forms and . . . such evidence is to be weighed
in connection with all other available evidence in determining the proper
measure of damages . . . it will be evident from the context of the decisions
in the various cases that the amount allowed in any case should be that to
which the claimant is reasonably entitled under all the circumstances.
Such a generality is of little help in coming to grips with the problem. It merely
reiterates that each case will be considered on its merits and facts, and the measure
of compensation will be arrived at in a manner which seems fair, just, and equitable
to the arbitrator or the tribunal.
Internationally, the decisions seem to be in agreement that contingent and
indeterminate damage cannot be taken into account.12 The position was quite
cogently and unequivocally stated by the United States-Germany Mixed-Claims
Commission."5 It said,
In computing the reasonable value of plants and other properties at the time
of their destruction, the nature and value of the business done, their earning
capacity based on previous operations, urgency of demand and readiness to
produce to meet such demand which may conceivably force the then market
value above reproduction costs, even the good will of the business, and many
other factors, have been taken into account. But this is quite a different thing
from assessing damage for loss of prospective earnings or profits for a period
of years computed arbitrarily or according to the earnings of competitors
whose properties were not destroyed, and the awards made by this commission
do not embrace the items claimed of prospective earnings or prospective profits.
In the exchange of notes between Mexico and the United States concerning
compensation for American owned lands expropriated in Mexico, 14 the United
States Government took the position that after a claimant had established his na-
tionality and the propriety of his title he was then entitled to,
• . . the just value of the property expropriated, the fair return from the
property of which claimant has been deprived between the time of expropria-
tion and the time of receiving compensation, as well as such other facts as in
the opinion of the commissioners should be taken into account in reaching a
determination as to compensation. 15
Some international jurists maintain that foreign nationals are entitled to an
international minimum standard of just and adequate compensation,1" while
11 Damages in International Law, Whiteman, Vol. 2, p. 1547.
1 1 World Court Reports, Hudson 684,
13Decisions & Opinions (1925-26) 273.
14 Full text of Official Notes July 21, 1938-November 12, 1938, supra, note 4.
15 ibid, p. 42. It is interesting to observe, in that exchange of notes, that the Mexican
Government vigorously advanced the theory, ". . . that the foreigner who voluntarily moves
to a country which is not his own, in search of a personal benefit, accepts in advance, to-
gether with the advantages which he is going to enjoy, the risks to which he may find him-
self exposed." The reply of the United States was just as vigorous and completely unequivocal.
Such a theory, the United States maintained, "... presupposes the maintenance of law and
order consistent with principles of International Law; that is to say, when aliens are admitted
into a country the country is obligated to accord them that degree of protection of life and
property consistent with the standards of justice recognized by the law of nations."
16 Facshiri, Expropriation & International Law, 6 British Year Book of International
Law 159, 160 (1925); Kaeckenbeeck, The Protection of Vested Rights in International Law,
17 British Year Boow of International Law 1, 16 (1936); 2 Hyde, International Law
876 (1945).
others assert merely that the international jurisprudential test is whether or not
both nationals and non-nationals have been treated alike.17 The International Court
of Justice and other arbitration tribunals have given credence to the fact that a
nation has an international liability to non-national owners of expropriated prop-
erty despite the fact that it acted as a result of non-discriminatory legislation.'8
Indeed, in the Sicilian Sulphur Monopoly Case in 1838,11 the principle of an inter-
national standard of justice was sustained which would, under certain circum-
stances, give non-nationals more than equality with nationals. Likewise, in the
Delagoa Bay Railway arbitration involving Portugal and the United States, Portu-
gal was required to pay compensation conforming to international standards.2 0
The tribunal that decided the DeSalba Case, 1 emphatically reiterated imposition of
international responsibility for taking of property. It said,
It is axiomatic that acts of government in depriving an alien of his property
without compensation impose international responsibility. Panama has at-
tempted to justify the result reached by asserting that the claimant failed to
comply with the duties and take advantage of the remedies created by Pana-
manian law. This justification the commission . . . finds to be unsustained.
Having determined these factors let us turn to an examination of the measure
and method of compensation for nationalization of property in certain European
countries where it has taken place.
22
In France, the amount of compensation paid dispossessed owners of nation-
alized property is based on the market quotations of the companies' stock in
designated periods during 1944 and 1945, or on evaluations made by special com-
mittees based upon the market value of the assets of the companies. The compensa-
tion is paid in government securities or in bonds of the public corporations
created by the nationalization laws.
2
1
17Baty, The Canons of International Law 131 (1930); Brierly, Law of Nations 178
(2nd ed. 1936); Williams, International Law and The Property of Aliens, 9 B. Y. B. I. L. 1,
15 (1928).
13 See Herz, Expropriation of Foreign Property, 35 A. J. I. L. 248 (1941). But cf.
Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad 125-26 (1915) (Contends that
legislative acts create liability on the part of the nation only in unusual circumstances.)
10 28 British and Foreign State Papers, 1837-38 at 1166 (1863).
20 See 2 Moore, History and Digest of the International Arbitrations, 1865 (1898).
21 Decided June 29, 1933, U. S.-Panama Claims Commission. See Lauterpacht Annual
Digest of Public International Law Cases, 1933-34 at 241 (1935).
22 Nationalization has been defined by one international jurist (Doman, Compensation
for Nationalized Property, 3 Int. L. Q. 323 (July, 1950)) as ". . . a general impersonal
taking of the economic structure in full or in part for the nation's benefit, with or without
compensation .. " Where there is no compensation or that offered is inadequate, nationali-
zation resembles confiscation; where there is an "... offer or granting of adequate compen-
sation, .... " it resembles expropriation.
23 E. g., stockades of the Banque de France were paid in bonds designated as Obliga-
tions de la Banque de France paying 3% interest; stockholders of the electric and gas com-
panies were compensated with bonds designated as obligations of those companies, as were
stockholders of the coal mines. All of these obligations pay 3% annual interest plus, under
certain circumstances, an additional sum varying with the income of the companies. Former
owners of deposit banks and insurance companies are paid in parts beneficiaries paying a
minimum of 3% interest. All these securities are amortisable over a period of 50 years
except the bank obligations which are to be paid in 20 years.
Behind the so-called "Iron Curtain", nationalization has gone forward with
breathtaking speed. Czechoslovakian industry was nationalized October 27, 1945,24
Polish industry, January 3, 1946,11 Yugoslavian industry, December 5, 1946,26
Hungarian industry, 1948 and 1949, Rumanian industry, June 11, 1948,27 and
Bulgarian industry in December, 1946.28
Czechoslovakia established an Economic Fund of Nationalized Property, an
independent legal entity authorized to issue interest-bearing certificates to be re-
deemed from the surplus earnings of the nationalized enterprises, but guaranteed as
to redemption and payment of interest by the state. The compensation is to com-
mence within six months from the day of service of the compensation assessment
order. The minister of industry and the minister of finance have the authority to
decide on the method of compensation .2 A special division in the Czechoslovak
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was activated to receive foreign claims. A few nations
entered into special agreements with Czechoslovakia in connection with compen-
sation claims.30
Polish nationalization law provides for a special commission to determine the
amount of compensation. This commission must, at the request of interested
persons, call qualified experts to evaluate the property transferred to the state. In
determining the amount of compensation to be paid the owner of the nationalized
property, these factors must be taken into consideration: (1) general decrease
in value of national wealth; (2) net value of the assets of the undertaking on the
day of its transfer to the state; (3) decrease in value of the undertaking as a
result of war losses and losses suffered in connection with the war and occupation
in the period between September 1, 1939 and the time of transfer to the state;
(4) the amount of investments made after September 1, 1939; (5) special
factors affecting the value of the undertaking (duration of concessions, licenses,
etc.) ." Compensation in Poland is to be paid in state obligations except in unusual,
economically justified cases when cash or other values can be authorized.
3 2
24 See Collection of Laws and Regulations of Czechoslovakian Republic, Numbers 100-
103 (1945).
23 See Sharp, Nationalization of Key Industries in Eastern Europe 75 (Foundation for
Foreign Affairs 1946),
20 Official Gazette of the Federal Peoples' Republic of Yugoslavia, Number 98, Decem-
ber 6, 1946.
27 Bill of "Nationalization of Industrial, Banking, Insurance, Mining and Transport
Enterprises" of June 11, 1948, published by the Ministry of Arts and Information (Bucha-
rest, 1948).
28 For the text of the Bill in English, see Nationalization of Industry and Banks in
Bulgaria (Press Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sofia, 1948.)
29 It is interesting to observe that conflicting compensation claims are decided by ad-
ministrative and not by judicial tribunals. See Collections of Laws and Regulations of the
Czechoslovakian Republic, No. 81, Decree No. 10 (1928).30 Up to July, 1950, few foreign owners of property in Czechoslovakia had received
little, if any, compensation.
51 Compensation for Nationalized Property, 3 Int. L. Q. 335-36 (July, 1950). The
United States reached an agreement with Poland in connection with international problems
created by the nationalization on December 27, 1946.
32 ibid.
In Yugoslavia, the government promised to pay owners of nationalized enter-
prises their net value on the day of nationalization. Payment was to be made in
government bonds payable to bearer except in unusual cases when payment may
be made in cash. The government may designate by decree the manner and time
of amortization of these bonds.3 8 In principle, the Yugoslav government announced
its willingness to return foreign property to its rightful owner under certain con-
ditions.34
Section 14 of the First Hungarian Nationalization Law provides that com-
pensation is to be prescribed by a separate act of parliament and that, in unusually
meritorious cases, an advance may be granted to provide a minimum standard of
living for the former owners or stockholders.3 5
Rumania established a Nationalized Industry Fund to issue securities redeem-
able solely from the net profit of the newly nationalized enterprises to discharge
the obligations of nationalization. Compensation was to be determined by com-
missions consisting of three magistrates appointed by the Ministry of Justice.36
The measure of compensation for nationalized property in Bulgaria is in-
vested capital only, not value of physical assets, worth as a going concern, or capi-
talization of earnings. By a later enactment, Bulgaria offered compensation in
interest-bearing bonds of the government, the amount determined on the basis of
an evaluation of assets of the nationalized enterprise reduced by a progressively
growing percentage in accordance with the table to be worked out by the Council
of Ministers. The language seems to suggest that something less than complete
compensation is integrated into the nationalization act.
37
Before turning again to the specific problem of measure of compensation for
nationalized property and attempting to point out the various theories upon which
it may be accomplished in the most justiciable and equitable fashion, it may be
profitable to look at certain generally established international principles in the
field of compensation and damages.
Punitive damages are rarely awarded and there is some doubt that they are
ever truly awarded.38 There does not seem to be any clear theory upon which one
nation may be penalized through exemplary or punitive damages.3 9 A government
33 supra, note 26.
3 Yugoslavia has entered into agreements to effect settlement of international obliga-
tions resulting from nationalization of property owned by citizens of countries other than
Yugoslavia, with Switzerland (with whom Yugoslavia engages in extensive commercial re-
lations), the United States (who was holding property belonging to Yugoslavia), and
Great Britain (who tied the agreement to a five year trade agreement).
35 Up to July 1950 no attempt was made in Hungary to compensate owners of na-
tionalized property.
36 supra, note 31, ;. 340.
a supra, note 31, p. 340-41.
38 Wormser, Collection of International War Damage Claims, p. 213, But cf., The
Chorzow Factory Case and the Walter Fletcher Smith Case, supra notes 9 and 10.
"9 But see precedi:ag note.
is responsible only for the direct and proximate results of its acts or omissions, and
indirect losses are not generally recoverable. 40
Although it has been repeatedly stated that interest is not allowable against a
government 41 either on the theory that "the king" is presumed to be ready and
willing to ,discharge his obligations or on the theory that interest is a penalty and
that "the king" can do no wrong, in the majority of cases that have been considered
by international tribunals, interest has been allowed in appropriate cases as a part
of the awards.4 2 In numerous cases the date of wrongful seizure of property for
which damage or compensation is claimed is adopted as the proper date from
which the running of interest is computed.4" In the United States, interest is al-
lowed as part of the damages or compensation for property taken under the right
of eminent domain as part of the just compensation required by the Constitution:
44
In England, interest is allowed from the time when possession is taken or from
the time of the initial award, whichever is earliest; 45 in Ireland from the time
when possession of the property is taken,4" and in Canada, normally, from the
time when possession is taken if entry is made in order to institute proceedings to
condemn.
4 7
A situation sufficiently analogous to warrant at least a superficial examination
is that in which a government requisitions private property during time of war,
either pursuant to a statute or by virtue of its inherent powers under its constitu-
tion. It has become well established that "Consequential damages or ex-
penses, incidental to and resulting from requisitioning of property for war pur-
poses, are not to be included in determining compensation to which. . ." a property
owner is entitled.48 Where there is a market value ascertainable when and where
the property is taken, such value is normally the just measure of compensation,49
40 5 Hackworth 724.
41 Sutherland, A Treatise on the Law of Damages (4th ed. 1916) 1039-1040.
42 Whiteman, Damages in International Law, Vol. 3, 1924. See also 33 A. J. I. L.
108, 110 Compensation for Expropriations, where it is said: "The matter of time of pay-
ment is among the factors that must always be considered because . . . the total amount will
fail to be fully or strictly compensatory if it does not make provision, among other things,
for interest on the investment or for loss of benefits to the owner after the property was
taken and prior to payment."
ibid, p. 1934, and footnote 109 therein.
4496 A. L. R. 150. In the Federal Courts interest is usually allowed from the time of
the actual entry into possession by the condemner unless the rule of the state in which the
land is situated required the allowance of interest from an earlier time.
45 95 A. L. R. 191 citing Regent's Canal Company v. Ware, 23 Beav. 575, 53 Eng.
Rep. 226 (1857).
46 96 A. L. R. 192 citing Blount v. Great Southern and W. R. Company 2 Ir. Ch. Rep.
40 (1851).
4796 A. L. R. 193 citing Re Foster 32 U. C. Q. B. 162 (1871).
461137 A. L. R. 1300 citing Gulf Ref. Company v. United States 58 Ct. Cl. 559 (1923);
Fairbanks M. & Company v. United States 81 Ct. Cl. 439 (1935). But see A & B Taxis v.
Secretary of State for Air 2B (Eng) 328 C. A. (1922).
49 137 A. L. R. 1302 citing United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U. S. 341
(1923); Borland v. United States, 57 Ct. Cl. 411 (1922); Standard Transportation Co. v.
United States, 61 Ct. Cl. 906 (1926) (writ of Cert. denied in 273 U. S. 732 (1926)).
provided the market i; free." This is true no matter what the property cost
the owner.51 In this connection it has been said that it is not the cost of the
property but the propirty itself that is protected by the Fifth Amendment,52 so
just compensation does not include prospective or anticipated profits.5 3 Interest in
these cases is generally allowed from the time of taking or requisition to the date
of payment.
5 4
Compensation for property expropriated in the United States is governed by
a constitutional standard.55 In England the standard is set by statute.55 The most
commonly used method in England in the past has been the net maintainable reve-
nue standard. This method computes compensation by a determination of the
average annual net earnings previously realized by the enterprise and an estimate
of those earnings in the future. That figure is then capitalized at the rate of return
on investments applicable to the business.57 Parenthetically, it is interesting to
note that American courts reject any attempt to capitalize earnings as too specu-
lative, " but ascertain plant value and going-concern value separately.5" The latter
seems scarcely less speculative.
In certain areas, compensation under the nationalization program has been
predicated on the amount that a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for the
assets, i.e., market value. 0 Market value for trucking companies was determined
by individual assessments of physical asset value and "cessation of business dam-
ages." The latter is a means of expressing going-concern value. This may have
resulted from a realization that net maintainable revenue does not adequately com-
pensate the owners of a new and growing business."
Both market value and net maintainable revenue were abandoned when the
banking industry was nationalized.6 2 In that instance, shareholders were given
sufficient government bonds to return them an annual income equivalent to that
50 137 A. L. R. 1303 citing National City Bank v. United States, 275 Fed. 855 (D. C.
1921) (Affirmed in 3.922). See also Prince Line v. United States, 283 Fed. 535 (D. C.
1922) (writ of error dismissed 263 U. S. 727 (1923)).
51 ibid. See also L. Vogelstein & Co. v. United States, 262 U. S. 337 (1923).
52 Brook-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U. S. 106 (1924).
5 De Laval Steam Turbine Co. v. United States, 284 U. S. 61 (1931); Russell Motor
Car Co. v. United States, 57 Ct. Cl. 464 (1922) (Affirmed in 261 U. S. 514 (1923)).
64 Moore V. United States, 60 Ct. Cl. 326 (1925); Thermal Syndicate v. United States,
81 Ct. Cl. 446 (1935); R. S. Howard Co. v. United States, 81 Ct. Cl. 646 (1935).
5 U. S. Const., Amends. V, XIV; Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13 (1933).
51lRegina v. St. Lukes, 7 Q. B. 148 (1841).
5, For an excellent discussion of the problems involved in this computation see 151
The Economist 223 (1946).
58 National Watorworks Co. v. Kansas City, 62 Fed. 853 (8th Cir. 1894); Kennebec
Water District v. Wa,*erville, 97 Me. 185, 54 Atl. 6 (1902).
59 Baxter Springs v. Bilger's Estate, 110 Kan. 409, 204 Pac. 678 (1922); Mifflin Bridge
Co. v. Juniata County, 144 Pa. 365, 22 Atl. 896 (1891).
60 Electricity Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. VI, c. 54; Transport Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo.
VI, c. 49; Cable and Wireless Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. VI, c. 82; Coal Industry Nationaliza-
tion (Collieries) Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. VI, c. 59.
I" See 151 The Economist 223 (1946).
62 Bank of England Act, 1946, 9 & 10, Geo. VI, c. 27.
received in the form of dividends from bank holdings. This was more an acqui-
sition of capital rights in an industry controlling the financial structure of a nation
than it was a taking-over of some physical assets with a going concern value. Such
a transaction does not lend itself well to a concept of market value. 3
Consequential losses to owners of nationalized property fall into two classes:
(1) losses incidental to the taking; and (2) severance losses. 4 Examples of the
former are costs of removing unpurchased assets and loss of good will. An ex-
ample of the latter is the reduction in value of remaining property. English courts
may allow compensation for such losses unless forbidden by statute. 5
Prior to nationalization, cash was most frequently used in England in paying
for condemned property, although it was not constitutionally required." By judicial
decision in the United States, cash must be given for condemned property. 7 Under
the English nationalization program, however, the major items were paid in low
interest bonds.66 Cash payments were considered undesirable because of the dif-
ficulty of raising required amounts of cash as well as the unsettling effect on the
money market of the sudden appearance of money in such large quantities.
Any discussion of the problem of compensation for nationalization of prop-
erty would be incomplete without an examination of the theory behind a just and
fair measure of compensation. Such an end may well never be attainable. No at-
tempt will be made here to resolve that question, but it is believed that this
should be the goal toward which all measures of compensation should be directed
if nationalization of property is to survive. There should be an acceptance of the
profit-earning capacity of an industry as a basis of compensation. Without it,
nationalization cannot survive except at the expense of a society that might well
eventually overthrow the government either by relatively peaceful means or by
armed revolt.
In order to preserve the economic structure of the government-and the
government itself-during the change-over from a capitalistic system to a state
capitalistic one wrought by nationalization of private property, compensation must
be paid the former owners of the property. In the interest of society as a whole,
compensation must be the minimum amount possible that does not upset the
economic system. As a practical matter, if too great a price is paid, the cost of
goods and services to consumers would be greater than they feel they should bear.
They will be dissatisfied with the results of the nationalization.
6 See Minutes of Proceedings of the Select Committee on the Bank of England Bill 7
(1945).
64 See McCormick, Damages 535-542 (1935).
65 Moving costs; Cooper v. Metropolitan Board of Works 25 Ch. D. 472 (C. A. 1883).
Good Will: Senior v. Metropolitan Ry. 2 H. & C. 258, 159 Eng. Rep. 107 (Ex. 1863).
66 Statutes have usually specified the payment medium.
67 Vanhorn v. Dorrance 2 DalI. 304 (U. S. 1795).
C s8upra, notes 60 and 62.
The compensation ' aid should place no greater charge on the industry than
it is able to bear and int,. rest charges arising out of compensation should not be an
onerous burden on the lights of the consumer nor on the wages or working con-
ditions of the employee Where, despite application of these principles, it is still
not possible to award co -npensation that the industry can afford, government assist-
ance must be given. A alanced budget should be maintained insofar as possible.
Any interest guaranteed should be for a limited period only. In the alternative, a
subsidy reconsidered ani ually could be granted. Loans might also be made at low
or no interest in order to carry out reconstruction and reorganization. The least
desirable stock of the nationalized enterprise should carry a maximum but no
minimum dividend; df.e amount payable would fluctuate either with adjusted
earnings or production. A low minimum rate might be guaranteed in certain in-
stances for a limited n.mber of years in order to assure a displaced equity holder
some income. The com?ensated stockholder should have no vote in the control of
the nationalized enterprise nor obtain any pecuniary benefit from the greater
security of his investmc nt; neither should he have the right to enforce any sanction
if the nationalized ente :prise defaulted in the payment of its obligation .6
There are four pcssible bases of valuation: (1) stock exchange values; (2)
asset values; (3) capitalized earning power; and (4) a global sum based on the
amount a willing buyei would pay to a willing seller; i.e., market value. Where the
last is practical, it is p :eferable. Where it is not, a combination of (2) and (3)
assures the best metho 1. Compensation should then be based on a combination of
the potential earning lower of the nationalized enterprise and its capital valuation.
Compensation should be computed so as to constitute a return on the capital value
of capital assets acquijed, weighted by past earnings adjusted to consider probable
future ones and limite i by statute.70
Any feasible global sum should be ascertained by a tribunal directed to assay
the value at which thc: industry could be assessed in a sale in a free market. There
should be no allowan e because of compulsory acquisition.
If a combinatior of earning and asset value is determined to be the proper
course, each company s or industry's assets would have to be evaluated at a going-
concern rate. This could be based on either original cost adjusted to current prices
less depreciation, cala dated according to the best current commercial practice, or on
a ", . . basis of valucs placed by the company on- its assets in its tax returns."
7'
It may be objected t aat tax return valuation of assets may not be a true one. If
that objection is val.d, then the industry is merely paying for its past sins and
omissions. Land would be acquired at the amount a willing buyer would give a
69 How Much Co npensation? Ernest Davies, New Fabian Research Bureau Society,
No. 33.
70Ibid, p. 57.
71 Ibid, p. 58.
willing seller. Earnings would be taken over a reasonably long period and ad-
justed to a common level.
No attempt is made here to justify these principles or bases from a philosophi-
cal or jurisprudential view-point: It is merely desired to point out that, no matter
what the actual measure of compensation today for nationalization of property,
any valid and lasting measure of compensation must take into consideration the
factors set out above.
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Cruel and Unusual Punishments
A punishment is regarded as a penalty imposed by authority on one who
transgresses the law. Its infliction is consequent upon the evil act of the offender.
As a sanction it must operate in opposition to the malfactor's will by effectively
depriving him of some good, such as life, integrity of the body, liberty, or exterior
goods. The deprivation of any of these goods is a penalty. Hence, punishments
are often classified as loss of life, loss of bodily integrity, loss of freedom of spon-
taneous action, or loss of external goods, e.g. riches, country, and fame.
While the above are generally thought to be substantial deprivations and,
therefore, suitable punishments, their intensity of application has varied through
the centuries. Under the Old Law of the Hebrews, for example, the means of in-
flicting punishment was the lex talionis, or law of retaliation: a method of mutila-
tion exacting an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a life for a life.
In the past 200 years alone, there have been at least three schools of penal
philosophy, each with varying concepts of punishment. The first was the classical
school. When, during the latter half of the eighteenth century, men were keenly
aware of the philosophical concept of the freedom of the will, penalties were
immutable. The individual breaking the rule did so of his own free will, and if
apprehended and convicted, paid the penalty. Hence, it was felt by those of the
classical school that the punishment for the same crime should always be the same
because the moral responsibility was the same.1 From this there developed the
second or neoclassical school. While recognizing freedom of the will, it also
recognized that education, heredity, and other factors may affect freedom of
choice, thereby lessening responsibility. The classical theory of punishment under-
went a gradual change, so that the penalty for crime soon came to be graded in
proportion to the individual's amount of freedom and responsibility. The third or
determinist theory denies freedom of the will. If followed to its logical conclusion,
1 Orme v. Rogers, 32 Ariz. 502, 260 Pac. 199 (1927).
